Verisign is excited to announce that its easy-to-configure, cloud-based, recursive DNS filtering service, Verisign DNS Firewall, is now certified to run on Microsoft Azure. This service will help protect your Microsoft Azure virtual machines from malware command-and-control traffic and navigation to undesirable websites.
Verisign is pleased to announce that we qualified for the Online Trust Alliance’s (OTA) 2017 Honor Roll for showing a commitment to best practices in security, privacy and consumer protection. This is the fifth consecutive year that Verisign has received this honor.
The OTA is an initiative within the Internet Society (ISOC) with the mission to promote best practices for online trust. Now in its ninth year, the 2017 OTA audit analyzed nearly 1,000 websites across multiple industry segments, evaluating the websites for consumer protection, security and privacy protection practices, and has been embraced by organizations worldwide as an objective benchmark report.
Verisign just released its Q1 2017 DDoS Trends Report, which represents a unique view into the attack trends unfolding online, through observations and insights derived from distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack mitigations enacted on behalf of Verisign DDoS Protection Services.
Launching a DDoS attack is much more accessible to attackers thanks to the rise of cloud computing, cheap hosting, readily available bandwidth and open-source attack tools. From low-skilled teenagers aiming to cheat while playing online games to cybercriminals looking to supplement their income by renting out their botnets for opportunistic attacks, the DDoS-for-hire market is booming.
Verisign just released its Q4 2016 DDoS Trends Report, which represents a unique view into the attack trends unfolding online, through observations and insights derived from distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack mitigations enacted on behalf of Verisign DDoS Protection Services and security research conducted by Verisign iDefense Intelligence Services.
Verisign just released its Q3 2016 DDoS Trends Report, which provides a unique view into online distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack trends from mitigations enacted on behalf of Verisign DDoS Protection Services and research conducted by Verisign iDefense Security Intelligence Services.
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) flood attacks continue to dominate in Q3 2016, making up 49 percent of the total attacks in the quarter. The most common UDP flood attacks mitigated were Domain Name System (DNS) reflection attacks, followed by Network Time Protocol (NTP) reflection attacks.
The highest intensity flood attack in Q3 2016 was a TCP SYN flood that peaked at approximately 60 Gigabits per second (Gbps) and 150 Million packets per second (Mpps). This flood attack is one of the highest packets per second attacks ever observed by Verisign, surpassing the previous flood of 125 Mpps mitigated by Verisign in Q4 2015.
The largest attack in Q3 2016 utilized the Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol (IP protocol 47) and peaked at 250+ Gbps and 50+ Mpps. This is the first time Verisign observed this type of attack against our customer base.
A few weeks ago, on Oct. 1, 2016, Verisign successfully doubled the size of the cryptographic key that generates Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) signatures for the internet’s DNS root zone. With this change, root zone Domain Name System (DNS) responses can be fully validated using 2048-bit RSA keys. This project involved work by numerous people within Verisign, as well as collaborations with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA).
As I mentioned in my previous blog post, the root zone originally used a 1024-bit RSA key for zone signing. In recent years the internet community transitioned away from keys of this size for SSL and there has been pressure to also move away from 1024-bit RSA keys for DNSSEC. Internally, we began discussing the root Zone Signing Key (ZSK) length increase in 2014. However, another important root zone change was looming on the horizon: changing the Key Signing Key (KSK).
Layer 7 attacks are some of the most difficult attacks to mitigate because they mimic normal user behavior and are harder to identify. The application layer (per the Open Systems Interconnection model) consists of protocols that focus on process-to-process communication across an IP network and is the only layer that directly interacts with the end user. A sophisticated Layer 7 DDoS attack may target specific areas of a website, making it even more difficult to separate from normal traffic. For example, a Layer 7 DDoS attack might target a website element (e.g., company logo or page graphic) to consume resources every time it is downloaded with the intent to exhaust the server. Additionally, some attackers may use Layer 7 DDoS attacks as diversionary tactics to steal information.
A few months ago I published a blog post about Verisign’s plans to increase the strength of the Zone Signing Key (ZSK) for the root zone. I’m pleased to provide this update that we have started the process to pre-publish a 2048-bit ZSK in the root zone for the first time on Sept. 20. Following that, we will publish root zones with the larger key on Oct. 1, 2016.
To help understand how we arrived at this point, let’s take a look back.
Verisign just released its Q2 2016 DDoS Trends Report, which provides a unique view into online distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack trends from mitigations enacted on behalf of customers of Verisign DDoS Protection Services and research conducted by Verisign iDefense Security Intelligence Services.
Every industry is at risk as DDoS attacks continue to increase in frequency, consistency and complexity. Comparing year-over-year attack activity, Verisign mitigated 75 percent more attacks in Q2 2016 than in Q2 2015. The largest attack mitigated by Verisign in Q2 2016 peaked at 250+ Gbps before settling in at 200+ Gbps for almost two hours.
Verisign also observed a growing trend of low-volume application layer, or Layer 7, attacks that probe for vulnerabilities in application code and exploit HTTP/S field headers within request packets to disable applications. These attacks were frequently coupled with high-volume UDP flood attacks to distract the victim from the Layer 7 attack component, often requiring multiple and advanced filtering techniques.